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ABSTRACT
System-on-chip design is becoming increasingly complex as technology scal-
ing enables more and more functionality on a chip. This scaling and complex-
ity has resulted in a variety of reliability and validation challenges including
logic bugs, hot spots, wear-out, and soft errors. To make matters worse,
as we reach the limits of Dennard scaling, e↵orts to improve system perfor-
mance and energy e ciency have resulted in the integration of a wide variety
of complex hardware accelerators in SoCs. Thus the challenge is to design
complex, custom hardware that is e cient, but also correct and reliable.
High-level synthesis shows promise to address the problem of complex
hardware design by providing a bridge from the high-productivity software
domain to the hardware design process. Much research has been done on
high-level synthesis e ciency optimizations. This thesis shows that high-level
synthesis also has the power to address validation and reliability challenges
through two solutions.
One solution for circuit reliability is modulo-3 shadow datapaths: per-
forming lightweight shadow computations in modulo-3 space for each main
computation. We leverage the binding and scheduling flexibility of high-level
synthesis to detect control errors through diverse binding and minimize area
cost through intelligent checkpoint scheduling and modulo-3 reducer shar-
ing. We introduce logic and dataflow optimizations to further reduce cost.
We evaluated our technique with 12 high-level synthesis benchmarks from
the arithmetic-oriented PolyBench benchmark suite using FPGA emulated
netlist-level error injection. We observe coverages of 99.1% for stuck-at faults,
99.5% for soft errors, and 99.6% for timing errors with a 25.7% area cost and
negligible performance impact. Leveraging a mean error detection latency
of 12.75 cycles (4150x faster than end result check) for soft errors, we also
explore a rollback recovery method with an additional area cost of 28.0%,
observing a 175x increase in reliability against soft errors.
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Another solution for rapid post-silicon validation of accelerator designs
is Hybrid Quick Error Detection (H-QED): inserting signature generation
logic in a hardware design to create a heavily compressed signature stream
that captures the internal behavior of the design at a fine temporal and
spatial granularity for comparison with a reference set of signatures gener-
ated by high-level simulation to detect bugs. Using H-QED, we demonstrate
an improvement in error detection latency (time elapsed from when a bug
is activated to when it manifests as an observable failure) of two orders of
magnitude and a threefold improvement in bug coverage compared to tradi-
tional post-silicon validation techniques. H-QED also uncovered previously
unknown bugs in the CHStone benchmark suite, which is widely used by the
HLS community. H-QED incurs less than 10% area overhead for the acceler-
ator it validates with negligible performance impact, and we also introduce
techniques to minimize any possible intrusiveness introduced by H-QED.
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CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND
Designing hardware is hard. A system designer chooses a custom hardware
design when a pure software solution is inadequate for power consumption
and/or performance reasons. Thus problems that require a hardware solu-
tion already come with demanding power and performance constraints. With
the end of Dennard scaling, improvements in power consumption and perfor-
mance for CPU-based software platforms have slowed down, pushing more
and more system designers to custom hardware solutions.
The result is an explosion in system complexity with increasing e↵ort and
chip area dedicated to custom hardware on SoCs. To make matters worse,
designers often have additional constraints: limited time to get into a mar-
ket, complex functionality demanded by that market, and limited chip area
budgets due to fabrication costs.
As if this were not enough, the continuation of Moore’s law scaling has
resulted in new hardware reliability problems. Reliably operating billions of
transistors is not easy when power “brown outs” start occurring and ther-
mal hot spots start forming as transistors are packed closer together. Reli-
ably fabricating smaller wires and devices is also not easy, resulting in more
permanent defects. Smaller devices are more vulnerable to particle strikes,
which manifest as soft errors. Physical e↵ects cause smaller transistors to
wear out, resulting in longer gate propagation delays leading to timing errors
after prolonged use. All of this does not even consider that designers them-
selves, without needing any help from circuit physics, are more than capable
of creating their own logic bugs to trip over in their complex designs.
Clearly there is a need for e↵ective methods to manage the complexity of
hardware design. High-level synthesis, also known as behavioral synthesis,
is one such approach. HLS provides a bridge from the high-productivity
software world to the hardware design world, enabling hardware designers
to create behavioral specifications of their design in dialects of traditionally
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software languages. HLS frees hardware designers from the tedious details of
hardware resource allocation, scheduling, and binding, allowing them to focus
on meeting design requirements and designing e↵ective hardware algorithms.
From a research point of view, starting from a behavioral specification pro-
vides the synthesis engine with richer information about the behavior and
architecture of a design, enabling scheduling and binding optimization po-
tential not possible with RTL design entry, and giving the synthesis engine
more freedom to exploit this flexibility to meet multiple optimization goals.
In this thesis, I discuss my research to leverage this power of HLS to ad-
dress the aforementioned hardware reliability and validation problems. In
Chapter 3, I propose creating a redundant, but smaller “shadow” datapath
based on modulo arithmetic to detect reliability problems in a design’s main
datapath. HLS is critical here because it provides a clear picture of the
datapath of the design and enables e↵ective sharing of expensive checksum
computing resources. In Chapter 4, I propose the insertion of signature gen-
eration logic in a hardware design to create a heavily compressed signature
stream that captures the internal behavior of the design at a fine temporal
and spatial granularity. By comparing the generated sequence of signatures
to a reference set generated by high-level simulation, I can detect both logic
and electrical bugs in hardware designs. HLS also plays a critical role here
by identifying important variables to capture and enabling the sharing of ex-
pensive signature generation logic. Before these main chapters, I will provide
some background on the reliability and validation problems hardware design-
ers face in the rest of this chapter and discuss related work in Chapter 2.
This thesis is based on my two publications in DAC 2015: “High-Level
Synthesis of Error Detecting Cores through Low-Cost Modulo-3 Shadow
Datapaths” [1] and “Hybrid Quick Error Detection (H-QED): Accelerator
Validation and Debug using High-Level Synthesis Principles” [2].
1.1 Root Causes for Hardware Failure
Figure 1.1 provides an overview of the hardware engineering process, which
consists of the following steps:
1. The designer writes a Verilog and/or VHDL description of the design.
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Figure 1.1: The hazards inherent in designing custom hardware
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For improved productivity, the designer may also elect to specify design
blocks at the behavioral level in SystemC or his HLS-tool’s proprietary
C dialect.
2. The designer simulates behavioral design blocks using a software com-
piler.
3. The designer uses a high-level synthesis tool to generate an RTL im-
plementation of behavioral design blocks.
4. The test engineer runs the resulting RTL implementations through an
RTL simulation tool.
5. The designer runs the RTL blocks through logic synthesis to generate
a technology mapped gate netlist.
6. The test engineer may simulate the netlist with a netlist simulation
tool. Simulation at this stage is very slow.
7. The designer runs the gate netlist through a placement and routing
engine, which produces a physical design.
8. The test engineer may simulate the physical design with a chip simu-
lation that takes wire and gate delays into account. This simulation is
extremely slow.
9. The designer sends the physical design to a foundry, which fabricates
the chip.
10. Test engineers test the actual hardware to verify that it meets specifi-
cations and validate that it implements the correct design.
11. Hardware that passes post-silicon testing is sent to end-users who de-
ploy it in their systems.
Figure 1.1 also shows what can go wrong during the hardware engineering
process, which we now discuss in the following subsections.
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1.1.1 Logic Bugs
Logic bugs are mistakes that the hardware designer makes in writing the
C or RTL version of a design that cause it to function in violation of the
design specification. Most of these bugs are caught in high-level simulation
or RTL simulation. Due to the complexities of system design it is di cult to
design these tests such that they exercise every possible interaction between
a design block under test and other design blocks around it. Thus some logic
bugs escape high-level and RTL simulation and can make it into the physical
design. Some of those bugs evade detection in post-silicon testing and survive
all the way to deployment. We define two primary classes of logic bugs:
• Deterministic logic bugs have well defined behavior that is not com-
piler or synthesis tool dependent. For input languages with well defined
standards, semantics that are defined in the standard are deterministic
for tools that conform to the standard. An example of a deterministic
logic bug is a memory copy operation for input data that simultane-
ously (for faster performance) copies the first half of an input array
to both halves of an output array when the programmer intended to
copy corresponding halves of the whole input array to the whole output
array.
• Nondeterministic logic bugs do not have well defined behavior; the
behavior can depend on the compiler or synthesis tool used, how the
tool was configured, what environment the tool was run in or the design
was tested in, and even other parts of the design that are seemingly un-
related; the behavior of these bugs can depend on almost anything! For
input languages with well defined standards, nondeterministic seman-
tics may be specified as resulting in “undefined behavior.” An example
of a nondeterministic logic bug is a read from uninitialized memory.
1.1.2 Hot Spots
Hot spots are regions on a chip that exceed local heat dissipation capacity
and/or power supply capacity under certain operating conditions. Hot spots
happen when a large amount of transistor switching activity is concentrated
in a small region of a chip. An excess current demand that lasts long enough
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causes voltage drops on power supply wires, resulting in longer than expected
transistor delays. High power consumption exceeding the thermal dissipation
capability of a region of a chip that lasts long enough results in excess heat
that causes the transistors in that region, which are not designed to operate
at high temperature, to slow down. The net e↵ect is that signal propagation
delays increase, leading to timing errors (defined in Section 1.2.1).
1.1.3 Fabrication Defects
Fabrication defects result in gates implementing the wrong logic function (or
being permanently bypassed) due to wire or transistor fabrication failures.
These permanent defects typically manifest as stuck-at faults: wires that are
supposed to be the output of a logic gate are stuck at logic 0 or logic 1 and
never change regardless of circuit input.
1.1.4 Soft Errors
Soft errors are caused by a particle striking a transistor with enough energy
and the right timing to cause bit-flips in storage elements including flip-
flops, SRAM cells, and DRAM cells. The victim transistor can be part of
the storage element, or an upstream gate that propagates a resulting logic
glitch. These particles are typically part of a shower of particles that results
when a cosmic ray strikes the Earth’s atmosphere. Thus these events are
random and unpredictable in nature.
1.1.5 Wear Out
Like mechanical systems, MOSFETs can wear out from prolonged, heavy use.
High-energy charge carriers can build up over time in a MOSFET’s insulating
dielectric, increasing the threshold voltage which causes the transistor to
switch more slowly. Bias temperature instability (BTI) is another e↵ect that
can charge the insulating dielectric over time, although some of its e↵ects
are temporary [3]. Like hot spots, both of these problems can lead to timing
errors (defined in Section 1.2.1). Unlike hot spots, these aging e↵ects can
take years to develop.
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Worse problems can occur when the dielectric layer breaks down, which
can result in a short that causes a permanent failure of a transistor. An-
other e↵ect called electromigration causes atoms in wires to slowly “flow”
downstream, thinning the wire upstream until it becomes a permanent open
circuit defect [3].
1.2 Root Cause E↵ects
The e↵ects of many of the above root causes are predictable enough that
they can be modeled. For each e↵ect, there are activation conditions, or
conditions required for the e↵ect to occur. More precisely, an activation
condition is the condition required for an error, fault, or bug to change the
internal behavior of a design. Thus if an error, fault, or bug is not activated,
then it is undetectable even with perfect observability of the internal behavior
of a design.
1.2.1 Timing Errors
Power and thermal hot spots, charge carrier injection, and bias temperature
instability all result in transistors switching more slowly than they normally
would. The result is that signal propagation delays along chains of gates
increase, resulting in a signal taking so long to propagate from a launch flip-
flop to a latch flip-flop that it misses the latch window. The result is that
the wrong value can be latched at the latch flip-flop; when this occurs it is
known as a timing error.
We can model this timing error as a bit flip at the latch flip-flop, given
these four activation conditions for a timing error to occur along a given
combinational path at a given cycle from a launch flip-flop to a latch flip-
flop:
1. The sum of the arrival time of the launch flip-flop output and delays
of each gate along the path must exceed the required arrival time for
the latch flip-flop input.
2. The path must be sensitized, meaning that all logic values are such that
a flip in the logic value of the launch flip-flop results in a flip along each
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segment of the path up to and including the latch flip-flop.
3. The launch flip-flop toggles at the given cycle.
4. The latch flip-flop latches the wrong value. Favorable glitches may
cause the latch flip-flop to latch an intermediate value that happens to
be correct even though the final value arrives too late.
1.2.2 Stuck-at Faults
Fabrication defects result in gate outputs being stuck at either a 0 or a 1. The
more dramatic wear-out problems that cause permanent defects can also have
this e↵ect. Modeling these faults is straightforward: disconnect a net from
its original driver and connect it to a constant logic 0 or 1 instead. Stuck-at
0 (1) faults have one activation condition, which is that the input logic values
to the gate with the stuck-at fault are such that the output should be 1 (0).
The result is an internally detectable deviation in the behavior of a design.
1.2.3 Soft Errors
Soft errors cause random logic values to be injected into storage elements
of a design, overwriting the previous value. For this event to be internally
observable, the activation condition is that the value injected must di↵er
from the value that would otherwise be latched at the storage element at
the time of injection. Thus we model these events as random bit-flips at
random cycles in randomly selected storage elements, using the value that
would normally be latched as the reference for the flip.
1.2.4 Logic Bugs
While logic bug activation conditions and e↵ects are in general more di cult
to pin down than the above electrical bug scenarios, they still exist. Logic
bugs have activation conditions, which are the conditions under which the
internal behavior of a design deviates from what the designer expects, and
e↵ects, which are the actual behavior of the bug as compared to a designer’s
expectations.
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1.3 Error Propagation
When an error, fault, or bug is activated, it has by definition begun to
change the internal behavior of a circuit. This change in behavior is not
necessarily externally observable, however. Errors that are activated have
multiple possible outcomes:
• The error e↵ects are masked before they a↵ect any output of the cir-
cuit. This means the error changes the internal behavior of the circuit
temporarily, but that eventually the circuit reverts to behaving as if
the error had never activated. Externally (i.e. observing the circuit
outputs), there is no way to know a masked error has activated. An
example of a masked error is a value that is computed incorrectly, but
is then ignored because it is not selected by a multiplexer.
• The error e↵ects change the output of the circuit. In this case we say
that the error is unmasked.
• For e↵ects that are not quickly masked or unmasked but instead make
it to internal storage elements, there can be a third “limbo” state known
as silent data corruption. In this state, the error has changed the in-
ternal behavior of the circuit, but whether the error will be masked
or unmasked depends on the next access to the corrupted storage el-
ements. For example, the corrupted elements may be overwritten, in
which case the error becomes masked or the corrupted elements may be
read and outputted, in which case the error becomes unmasked. Since
data can be stored in memory indefinitely, there is no limit to how long
silent data corruption can last.
While unmasked errors are clearly the most problematic, one should be care-
ful about considering masked errors to be benign. In the same way that
errors have activation conditions, errors are also sensitive to masking con-
ditions that can turn a masked error into an unmasked one. A particularly
insidious case is a masking condition that cause an error to be masked in test-
ing mode, but unmasked in production mode. Thus for circuit validation,
increasing observability to detect masked errors is also important.
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1.4 Modulo Arithmetic
Modulo-b arithmetic is arithmetic defined in a finite field with b possible
values, where each possible value corresponds to a remainder when an in-
teger is divided by b (using Euclidean division so that remainders are al-
ways positive). Addition, subtraction, and multiplication are defined with
“wraparound” arithmetic where the result is immediately divided by b and
the remainder taken as the result.
For example, in modulo-3 space the possible values are {0, 1, 2} and 2+2 =
1 since in integer space (2 + 2) mod 3 = 1 where a mod b is the remainder
after dividing a by b. Table 1.1 shows the mapping from integer space to
modulo-3 space and Table 1.2 provides the modulo-3 addition, subtraction,
and multiplication tables.
1.4.1 Properties
Since equivalent lightweight computations can be performed in modulo-b
space as in integer space, modulo-b arithmetic can be used as a way to
independently check integer computation. This works because we have de-
fined a homomorphism from integer arithmetic to modulo-b arithmetic. In
other words, given integers {x, y, z} and corresponding modulo-b variables
{x0, y0, z0} = {x, y, z} mod b we observe the following properties:
x+ y = z =) x0 + y0 = z0 (mod b) (1.1)
x  y = z =) x0   y0 = z0 (mod b) (1.2)
xy = z =) x0y0 = z0 (mod b) (1.3)
where (mod b) next to an equation indicates that the arithmetic is performed
in modulo-b space. Thus for Equations (1.1), (1.2), (1.3), z0 can be indepen-
dently computed two ways: by mapping z to modulo-b space or by mapping
x0 and y0 to modulo-b space and performing the “shadow computation” in
each equation.
Note that this “shadow computation” property holds for arbitrarily com-
10
Table 1.1: Integer to Modulo-3 Space Mapping
Integer value -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Modulo-3 value 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0
Table 1.2: Modulo-3 Addition, Subtraction and Multiplication Tables
+ 0 1 2
0 0 1 2
1 1 2 0
2 2 0 1
  0 1 2
0 0 2 1
1 1 0 2
2 2 1 0
⇥ 0 1 2
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 2
2 0 2 1
plex integer arithmetic involving addition, subtraction, and multiplication.
For example, x2 4xy+2y2 = z =) x02 x0y0+2y02 = z0 (mod b). Exploit-
ing the ability of homomorphisms such as this integer to modulo-b mapping
to scale to arbitrarily complex expressions is the key to implementing cost-
e↵ective error detection.
1.4.2 Aliasing
When using modulo-b arithmetic as an error detection technique, aliasing
occurs when the integer result of an erroneous computation corresponds to
the same modulo-b checksum as the correct result. For example, for modulo-3
arithmetic, if the correct integer result of a computation is 5, but the value -4
is produced instead, since both values map to 2 in modulo-3 space (Table 1.1)
the error may not be detected since the correct “checksum” was produced.
One should be particularly wary of the aliasing that can occur when mul-
tiplying by a multiple of b. For example, for modulo-3 arithmetic, if any er-
roneous integer value is multiplied by 6, then the result will be 0 in modulo-3
space (Tables 1.1 and 1.2). Thus, in my application of modulo-3 arithmetic,
I pay special attention to multiplication operations (see Section 3.1.2).
1.4.3 Modular Base
To use modulo-b arithmetic to detect errors e↵ectively in binary logic, I
choose b such that z0 = z mod b is a function of all of the bits in z. For
example, b = 4 would fail this test because now z0 is just the last two bits of
z, ignoring the higher order bits (and any errors in those bits). I also want
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each bit in z to have the ability to a↵ect any bit in z0 to reduce to probability
of aliasing. For example, b = 6 would fail this test because the last bit of z0
would only be a↵ected by the last bit of z. The choice of b will pass both of
these tests if b is odd and b   3. In this thesis, I choose b = 3 to minimize
the hardware cost, as only two bits are needed to represent the three possible
modulo-3 values.
1.5 Execution Signatures
A software program contains variables that will have dynamic values during
the program execution. Similarly, a hardware design has storage elements
such as flip-flops that will have dynamic values during hardware execution.
An execution signature is a hashed trace of the dynamic value of variables
during software or hardware execution. Comparing the trace of hardware to
be validated with a reference execution trace is a useful way to catch bugs.
As one might imagine, tracing all variables at all times during software or
hardware execution is expensive. We can use the following complementary
techniques to reduce that cost:
1. Select a subset of all variables to trace. This reduces overhead, but also
observability.
2. Create a diverse tracing schedule (i.e. di↵erent variables are traced in
di↵erent execution states). This allows tracing resources such as bu↵ers
and I/O ports to be shared, reducing overhead.
3. Hash some of the traced variables. In order for the hash to be re-
producible to detect errors, the values of the traced variable must be
known (i.e. if there is an unknown or “x” value, then the hash cannot
be reproduced and false bug detection positives will occur).
4. Compute a running hash to combine variables across cycles. Again all
of the values that go into this running hash must be known.
In Chapter 4, I use all four of these techniques, and hash all of the traced
variables to detect errors, using the high-level synthesis binding solution to
identify when register values are known.
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1.5.1 Catching Logic Bugs
If a design contains a nondeterministic logic bug and is run in a reference sim-
ulation and in hardware, the dynamic trace of the variable values will likely
be di↵erent. The simulation would involve a di↵erent process (e.g. compi-
lation by a high-level C compiler) than the hardware synthesis process, so
the undefined behavior would likely manifest itself di↵erently. For example,
the values stored in uninitialized memory in hardware could be the device
physics dependent power-on state, while uninitialized memory in a reference
simulation might contain values from when it was used by another software
process.
If a design only contains deterministic logic bugs and the simulation and
synthesis tools correctly interpret the input code, the dynamic hardware
and reference trace of the variable values will be identical. Thus hybrid
tracing techniques will not catch deterministic logic bugs. The good news is
that due to their deterministic nature, these bugs are easily reproducible in
both hardware and reference executions. Furthermore, for hardware designs
written in software input languages, we can leverage traditional software
debugging techniques to debug hardware designs.
1.5.2 Hash Functions
In order to minimize hardware cost, I select the following xor-based hash
functions:
H(x1, x2, ..., xn) = x1   x2   ...  xn (1.4)
Sn =
8<:H0   C if n = 0Hn   rotate(Sn 1, r) if n > 0 (1.5)
where H is the reduction function that reduces a set of multi-bit variable
values (technique 3 above) to a single hash. Similarly, Sn is my running hash
that combines the values of H across execution cycles (technique 4 above) (H
in cycle n is denoted Hn). The function rotate(v, r) denotes bit rotation to
the left of the bit vector v by r bits. C and r are constants. In Section 4.1.2,
I refer to the hardware that implements these hash functions as an XOR tree
and an LFSR, respectively.
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Both of these functions have the desirable property that a change in any bit
of the input variables will result in a change in at least one bit of the output.
Equation (1.5) has the additional desirable property that Sn depends on the
number of cycles that have passed, n, even if all Hn = 0.
1.6 High-Level Synthesis
High-level synthesis, also known as behavioral synthesis, is a process that
turns a software behavioral specification with an architectural description
into hardware that implements that specification. The input to a high-level
synthesis tool is typically a C language dialect with language extensions (e.g.
pragmas and directives) and libraries to annotate the behavioral description
with architectural specifications. The output is a hardware description, typ-
ically specified in Verilog or VHDL. A typical synthesis engine will perform
the following steps:
1. Compilation: The synthesis engine parses the input code and converts
it to an intermediate representation (IR).
2. Transformation and Optimization: The synthesis engine runs the
IR through a series of optimization passes, similar to software compiler
optimizations. The engine also does architectural transformations such
as loop unrolling and pipelining.
3. Allocation: For each hardware resource—memories, ports, registers,
and functional units—the synthesis engine determines what kind and
how many of each to use. Larger allocations usually increase perfor-
mance at the cost of area.
4. Scheduling: The engine creates a state machine corresponding to the
control flow of the software specification. For each state, the engine
determines what operations—computations, memory access, and/or
I/Os—will occur in that state. The engine may insert extra states
to provide su cient cycles to complete complex chains of operations.
5. Binding: For each operation, the engine determines which hardware
resource(s) will be involved in performing the operation. Operations
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that can never occur at the same time can share a common hardware
resource. The engine inserts multiplexers at this stage to facilitate such
sharing.
6. RTL Generation: The engine generates a complete RTL description
of the final state machine and datapath solution.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
2.1 Hardware Reliability
A traditional approach to error detection in hardware designs is by duplicat-
ing each component, also called dual modular redundancy (DMR) [4]. But
this approach comes with a 2x area cost that eliminates the area and power
reduction benefits of Moore’s law scaling. DIVA [5] is another popular tech-
nique which uses an extra checker core to verify the correctness of the main
core computation and commit only non-faulty results. Concurrent error de-
tection (CED) [6] uses HLS to introduce redundancy at the functional unit
level. Although each component is fully duplicated, this technique aims at
reducing area and performance overhead through resource sharing. But this
technique can incur at least 75% area cost for simple and small datapaths.
Another approach is time-redundancy, where we re-compute results using
the same hardware units to detect errors. [7] uses a time redundancy-based
concurrent error detection scheme with diverse binding solutions in its re-
computation stage but has performance overheads even though it incurs low
area cost. Argus [8] is a prototype processor with a modulo-3 arithmetic
checker that can detect up to 98.0% and 98.8% of unmasked transient and
permanent errors respectively. Argus has low area (17%) and performance
(4%) costs but it is limited to the Von Neumann processor architecture and,
to the best of our knowledge, there is no similar work in high-level synthesis
that targets application-specific custom logic and accelerator designs.
The traditional approach to reliable hardware is triple modular redundancy
(TMR) [9] where two additional units are added to the main unit and a ma-
jority voting unit. The three units perform the same computation and if any
of the three units fail, the other two units can correct and mask the fault. Al-
though TMR has a high fault coverage, it has a 3x area cost. [10] integrated
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modular redundancy into high-level synthesis and presented techniques to
increase reliability with cost and performance constraints and decrease cost
given reliability constraints, but not both together. New approaches to mod-
ular redundancy such as statistical error compensation (SEC) involving pair-
ing an estimator module with unreliable hardware still come with high (50-
100%) area cost [11]. Razor [12] is a gate level transformation that adds a
shadow latch for each flip-flop to detect timing errors. Although it has a
low area and performance overhead (<3%), it is limited to only detecting
timing errors. [13] proposes a technique to recover from soft errors but does
not perform any error injection experiments and has a passive approach to
masking errors whereas we actively detect and correct errors.
Compared to our reliability solution in Chapter 3, the techniques men-
tioned above have one or more of the following limitations:
1. Not automated;
2. Does not protect state machine and control logic;
3. Limited to a single fault model;
4. Has significant performance cost;
5. Has area costs approaching 2x or more.
2.2 Post-Silicon Validation
The inspiration for my H-QED PSV solution (Chapter 4) is QED [14, 15,
16, 17], which is a software technique for the post-silicon validation of pro-
grammable microprocessors. In general, PSV techniques that target proces-
sors (e.g., [18, 19] and others) are inadequate for bugs inside accelerators.
Although H-QED may appear to be similar to tracing techniques used in
PSV (e.g., using trace bu↵ers or system memory [20, 21, 22, 23]), there are
important di↵erences:
1. H-QED systematically collects signatures, unlike tracing techniques
that are often ad-hoc or based on heuristics;
2. H-QED does not require extensive low-level (e.g., RTL) simulation;
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3. H-QED does not require designer-crafted assertions;
4. H-QED enables very short error detection latencies and high bug cover-
age, unlike tracing techniques that become ine↵ective for di cult bugs
with long error detection latencies.
H-QED is distinct from fault-tolerant computing techniques for processors
(e.g., using watchdog processors, DIVA, multi-threading and signature tech-
niques for duplex systems [5, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28]). Many of these techniques
only check the register values as defined by the Instruction Set Architecture
(ISA). In contrast, H-QED is e↵ective for arbitrary hardware accelerators cre-
ated using HLS and automatically identifies signals to check in the resulting
designs. Unlike time redundancy and cycle stealing techniques for enhancing
reliability of designs created using HLS [29, 30, 31], H-QED utilizes unique
aspects of the PSV environment (where the generation of software signatures
after a PSV run is acceptable vs. reliability techniques that focus on quick
error recovery) to minimize area/performance costs and intrusiveness.
Given a high-level specification and a design produced by HLS (referred
to as an implementation), there is a large class of techniques that check if
the implementation is equivalent to the high-level specification, often relying
on formal techniques [32, 33, 34]. The goal is to detect bugs in the imple-
mentation that are caused by the HLS tool. However, equivalence checking
techniques cannot detect bugs that are in the high-level specification itself.
In contrast, H-QED detects bugs in the high-level specification (e.g., the C
source code in this paper) as well as bugs in the implementation caused by
the HLS tool.
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CHAPTER 3
ERROR DETECTION THROUGH
MODULO-3 SHADOW DATAPATHS
In this chapter, I propose creating a redundant, but smaller “shadow” dat-
apath based on modulo arithmetic to detect reliability problems in an HLS
design’s main datapath. I automate the creation of this “shadow” datapath
through a series of modulo-3 shadow datapath HLS transformations. Our
main innovations are:
1. Intelligent scheduling of intermediate register consistency checks for
maximum coverage with minimum checker allocation;
2. Support for mixed arithmetic/non-arithmetic data paths;
3. A register-duplication based checkpointing technique to demonstrate
the error correction potential of our approach;
4. An FPGA accelerated, fully automated error injection framework using
a gate-netlist transformation to enable accelerated injection for three
fault models;
5. Error detection latencies three orders of magnitude faster than an end
result check;
6. Unmasked error detection coverage of 99.42% for an assortment of three
di↵erent kinds of fault models.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 explains the
method we use to perform our error detection and correction transformations
and Section 3.2 discusses our experimental setup and results.
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3.1 Method
Our approach to protecting a hardware design is a series of modulo-3 shadow
datapath HLS transformations. An overview of how these transformations
fit into the HLS process is illustrated in Figure 3.1a. We use the LegUp
HLS scheduling engine [35] to schedule the original datapath, and perform
binding with our in-house binding engine. Our transformations involve some
additional scheduling steps (see Section 3.1.2). We perform our error detec-
tion transformations after scheduling but before binding to insure that the
latency of the hardware function does not increase.
Front-end (clang+LLVM)
Scheduler (LegUp)
Modulo-3 Transform
Shadow Datapath 
Optimization Passes
Binder (in-house)
Verilog RTL
C source code
LLVM-IR
Scheduled CDFG
Scheduled CDFG
Scheduled CDFG
(a) HLS Overview
+ 
+++ + + 
%3
%
3
= 
%
3
= 
Input 
Reducers
Register
Checkers
Output
Checkers
Shadow 
Functional 
Units
error
error
Shadow
Registers
(b) Modulo-3 Transform
Figure 3.1: Overview of our method. (a) Integration of our reliability
transformations into the high-level synthesis process. (b) Illustration of our
core mod-3 transform. The original datapath is colored black/white and
the shadow datapath is in blue.
Figure 3.1b provides an overview of our basic modulo-3 shadow datapath
transformation. For each input port, we add a mod-3 reducer to compute
the input value mod-3 residue, e↵ectively creating a shadow mod-3 input.
For each arithmetic functional unit (e.g. add, subtract, multiply), we add
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a corresponding shadow mod-3 functional unit. For each datapath flip-flop,
we add a corresponding 2-bit flip-flop to store and propagate the mod-3
checksum in a parallel datapath. For each output port, we add a mod-3
checker which consists of a reducer and 2-bit equality comparator, which
then drives shared error ports. The result is that each main computation
is independently performed in mod-3 space, and the two results are checked
for consistency. In the following two subsections, we discuss the design of
these mod-3 functional units and the transformation that inserts them into
high-level synthesized designs.
3.1.1 Modulo-3 Functional Units
Basic Functional Units
Mod-3 functional units represent the types of functional units which operate
in the mod-3 space. Since only two bits are required to encode three possible
values in mod-3 space, a simple approach is to use two representations for
0: 00 and 11, which is the approach taken for previous designs of mod-3
functional units. Our key innovation is to ignore the 11 encoding (we name
it the U value) and optimize it as a don’t care.
Table 3.1: Modulo-3 Adder Functional Specification Table
value encoding
0 00
1 01
2 10
U 11
+3 0 1 2 U
0 0 1 2 X
1 1 2 0 X
2 2 0 1 X
U X X X X
Table 3.2: Optimization Results for Shadow Mod-3 Units
Function
32-bit unit naive shadow optimized shadow
area delay area delay area delay
Add 163 1.30 17.6 0.15 9.30 0.08
Multiply 2381 2.05 10.9 0.08 5.75 0.05
Thus if either input is the U value, then the output does not matter as the
U case will never occur in normal operation. As illustrated in Table 3.1
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for the mod-3 adder, there are 9 fixed output cases and 7 don’t care output
cases for each two-input mod-3 unit. Through the use of Karnaugh maps, we
optimally exploited these don’t cares to find a low area cost design expressed
as a sum of products. We verified the optimality of our sum of products
solution through exhaustive search of all 47 possible don’t care assignments
(i.e. to check for better solutions involving compound gates). Table 3.2
shows the e↵ects of our optimization. For logic synthesis, we implemented
our designs in Verilog, used Synopsys Design Compiler 2013-12.sp4 with an
ARM 45nm standard cell library, and optimized for minimum area. We
measure area in square micrometers and delay in nanoseconds.
Constant Functional Units
We also consider an additional class of constant operation units generated by
high-level synthesis, units that have a constant as one input. We can think
of this constant as “baked-in” to the logic of the unit so that structurally the
unit has a single input and a single output. For example, a “+10” constant
operation unit takes some value x as input and outputs x+ 10.
Table 3.3: Shadow Unit Metrics for Operation with Constant c
Function
c = 0 c = 1 c = 2
area delay area delay area delay
Add c 0 0 0.96 0.02 0.96 0.02
Multiply by c 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3.3 shows the cost of the constant operation versions of our mod-3
units. Since we can reduce each constant to its mod-3 residue at compile
time, there are only three versions of each constant unit. We observe that
the operations +0 and x1 have no area cost since they lower to the identity
function and x0 lowers to the constant zero for multiplication. As discussed
in Section 3.1.2, such operations are optimized out by our high-level synthesis
optimization passes.
With such functional unit optimizations, our method has an even greater
area-cost advantage over double or triple modular redundancy for arithmetic
datapaths.
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Modulo-3 Reducers
Mod-3 reducers are our modulo-3 residue computing units. They are imple-
mented as a tree of dlog n/2e stages of modulo-3 adders where n is the input
width, similar to the tree approach in [36]. An example reducer for n = 16
is illustrated in Figure 3.2. The design works by grouping the input bits into
pairs and e↵ectively constructing a base 22 = 4 representation of the input
value. Since 4n mod 3 = 1 for all n   0, each base 4 digit has the same
weight in mod-3 space and thus we can compute the mod-3 sum of all of the
digits in a straightforward tree reduction.
+3 +3 +3 +3
+3 +3
+3
16
22 22 2222
2
x
x mod 3
Figure 3.2: Optimized mod-3 reducer topology for a 16-bit unsigned
reducer. Optimized mod-3 adders are colored blue.
Table 3.4: Optimization Results for 32-bit Mod-3 Reducer
Reducer Type
[36] ours
area delay area delay
Unsigned 263 0.62 203 0.46
Signed 267 0.66 207 0.51
Since the first stage adders must take all possible values (0, 1, 2, and 3)
as inputs, we cannot perform don’t care optimizations for those units. But
since we design the first stage adders to normalize their output to be 0, 1, or
2, all subsequent stages can optimize the fourth (“3” or U) value as a don’t
care. To the best of our knowledge, this optimization was not previously
explored. With this optimization, we observe a 22-23% area cost reduction
and a 23-26% delay reduction compared to [36].
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Thus far, we have assumed that the original datapath uses an unsigned
bit encoding for all variables. To modify our reducers to handle a signed
(2s complement) variable, we leverage that the only di↵erence between the
unsigned and signed (2s complement) encodings is the weight of the most
significant bit (MSB). In the unsigned encoding, the MSB has a weight of
2n 1 while in the signed encoding, it has a weight of  2n 1 where n is the
number of bits. Without loss of generality, if we assume n is even, then
2n 1 mod 3 = 2 and  2n 1 mod 3 = 1. Since the second most significant
bit always has a weight of 1, the insertion of a half-adder is su cient to
normalize the two most significant bits for a signed reducer. Table 3.4 shows
the small cost of this extra half-adder.
3.1.2 High Level Synthesis Transformations
Our HLS transformations, as illustrated in Figure 3.1 on page 20, consist
of a core mod-3 transform that generates the shadow datapath as well as
some dataflow-level optimization passes on the generated mod-3 logic. Our
transformations operate on a scheduled control/data flow graph.
By leveraging the state machine and data flow graph information avail-
able in this HLS stage, we can perform transformations and optimizations
not possible at the RTL or gate-level stage. In the following subsections,
we discuss how we handle mixed arithmetic-nonarithmetic datapaths, the
scheduling of intermediate register consistency checks for maximum coverage
with optimized sharing, pipelining for deferred shadow datapath scheduling
to eliminate clock period overhead and lower area cost, and binding diversity
between the main and shadow datapaths for improved fault coverage.
Handling Non-arithmetic Components
HLS generated designs involve non-arithmetic components including state
machine logic, bitwise operations, and comparators that have single bit out-
puts. Each non-arithmetic component is duplicated such that each com-
ponent has a redundant counterpart. However, such units have low area
overhead. For example, bitwise operations have very low area cost and shifts
by a constant have zero area cost. We also observe low overheads for dupli-
cation of non-arithmetic units (Area and Delay overheads are mentioned in
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(a) non ! non
%3
⨉ ⨉ 
(b) non ! arith
+ + 
(c) arith ! non
+ + 
⨉ ⨉
(d) arith ! arith
Figure 3.3: Shadow/duplicate connection cases. For each subfigure, the
original graph is on the left and the redundant logic is on the right. For the
redundant logic, nonarithmetic components (“non”) are duplicated with the
duplicates in grey. Arithmetic components (“arith”) are mod-3 shadowed
with the shadows in blue. The unit labeled “%3” is a mod-3 reducer.
Table 3.5 on page 32).
There are a number of cases to deal with when we generate shadow con-
nections for arithmetic and non-arithmetic components, which are illustrated
in Figure 3.3. Connections between two duplicate components and between
two mod-3 components are straightforward: just make connections corre-
sponding to those in the original datapath (Figures 3.3a and 3.3d). We can
connect a duplicate component output (full bit width) to a mod-3 component
input (2 bit) through a mod-3 reducer (Figure 3.3b). Connecting a mod-3
component output to a duplicate component input is not possible since infor-
mation lost in the mod-3 reduction cannot be recovered. Thus the duplicate
component input is connected to the same output as the original component
(Figure 3.3c).
Making connections this way can leave some mod-3 components with out-
puts unconnected, which we call mod-3 sinks. For example, the mod-3 adder
in Figure 3.3c may not have a mod-3 component to connect to in its fanout.
Such mod-3 sinks may output an inconsistent mod-3 checksum due to an er-
ror that occurred in the main datapath, but there would be no way to detect
it. Thus we add a mod-3 checker for each mod-3 sink to insure such errors
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are detected.
We deal with constant multiplication by multiples of three in a similar
way since the mod-3 result is always zero (Section 1.4.2). Our optimization
passes will replace such a shadow multiplier with a constant, leaving no pin
to connect its original input to. Thus we treat constant multiplication by a
multiple of three as an additional shadow datapath barrier: if it results in a
mod-3 sink then we add a mod-3 checker.
Register Consistency Check Scheduling
Some errors may be masked in the main datapath (and thus masked in the
shadow datapath) before they reach the primary output. Other errors may be
unmasked, but undetected due to aliasing (see Section 1.4.2) that occurs in
the shadow datapath. To maximize our chances of detecting such errors, we
insert checkers on the output of datapath registers, using strategic scheduling
of check operations to share as many mod-3 reducers as possible.
Compared to the rest of the shadow datapath, reducers are expensive
(Compare Tables 3.2 and 3.4). Reducers are scheduled in fixed states for
use at output ports and mod-3 sinks to produce residues for checkers as
well as at input ports to provide shadow inputs (Figure 3.1b). Intermediate
register checkpoints, on the other hand, have flexible scheduling constraints
corresponding to their liveness state machine subgraph.
To exploit this flexibility and minimize reducer allocation, we select register
liveness intervals that are more than one cycle long and that extend across
a basic block boundary (control flow divergence or convergence). For each
liveness interval, we attempt to schedule a checkpoint at each use (read) of
the corresponding SSA variable1 with the constraint that we cannot schedule
more reducers at a state than have been allocated. The intuition behind this
method is that we want to catch errors right before they leave a register
to go through functional units where they may be masked or aliased. If the
checkpoint cannot be scheduled at a state, we attempt to recursively schedule
it at each of the state’s predecessors.
The core recursive algorithm is listed in Algorithm 1. In the event of a
scheduling failure, we allocate an additional reducer and try again until check
1Single-static assignment variable which is written only once and thus corresponds to
one liveness interval for a variable.
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Algorithm 1 Core recursive scheduling algorithm
function schedule(var, state)
if (var, state) has not been visited or scheduled then
if reducer count[state] = max reducers then
preds  state predecessors that var is live in
if preds = ; then
increment max reducers
restart scheduling process
end if
for each pred in preds do
schedule(var, pred)
end for
else
schedule check for (var, state)
increment reducer count[state]
end if
end if
end function
scheduling succeeds.
Pipelining for Deferred Shadow Datapath Scheduling
While our mod-3 shadow functional units have low latency (Tables 3.2 and
3.3), our mod-3 reducers have high latency (Table 3.4). In addition, the in-
sertion of a mod-3 checker on a mod-3 sink’s corresponding main component
can cause severe timing violations if the main component is part of an oper-
ation chain. Even if the timing violations are corrected through gate sizing,
the area cost can be quite large as 1x transistors are replaced with 4x and 8x
transistors to meet timing requirements. Ideally, we want all of the mod-3
components to be mapped to 1x gates for minimum area overhead.
Thus our solution is to insert pipeline flip-flops both in front of and behind
each mod-3 reducer. The shadow datapath schedule is then deferred by two
cycles, adding two cycles of error detection latency in exchange for reduced
area cost.
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Shadow Datapath Optimization Passes
Our mod-3 transformation can create no-op identity operations and redun-
dant components. This superfluousness motivated us to add a shadow dat-
apath optimization pass to eliminate them as shown in Figure 3.1a which
consists of two components:
1. Constant propagation and identity elimination: A +6 adder
results in the generation of a +0 mod-3 component, which is an identity.
A x6 multiplier evaluates to a constant 0 in mod-3 space, which could
then propagate to other operations and make their result evaluable at
compile time.
2. Redundant component elimination: A x8 and a x11 multiplier
both result in the generation of a x2 mod-3 component. If both multi-
pliers are connected to the same input, the second x2 mod-3 component
is redundant and can be removed.
Diverse Binding
We perform binding of our optimized and scheduled control and data flow
graph with our in-house binding engine, which creates diverse (di↵erent)
binding solutions between the original and duplicate / mod-3 datapaths.
Such diverse binding makes it di cult for control errors and stuck-at faults
to a↵ect both redundant datapaths in the same way. Further state machine
checking is enabled by comparing the state registers of the redundant state
machines and using one state machine to control the main datapath and an-
other one to control the duplicate and shadow datapaths. Both the shadow
datapath and the duplicate state machine run two cycles behind the main
computation, so synchronization is not an issue. The binding engine’s pri-
mary goal is to maximize sharing where profitable for area cost, minimizing
the number of reducers allocated.
3.1.3 Recovery
To enable error recovery for soft errors, we use a checkpoint and recovery
register transformation, illustrated in Figure 3.4. For each state and datapath
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register, we add a duplicate register to store checkpoint data. At regular
intervals (configurable), we assert the “save” signal to take a snapshot of
the state of each datapath and state register in a corresponding duplicate.
Error detection triggers a “restore” signal which recovers the state from the
previously recorded checkpoint, i.e. the cycle where the “save” signal was
asserted.
data in data out
(a) Original flop
data in
data out
restore
save
0
1
0
1
(b) Transformed flop
Figure 3.4: Flip-flop transformation for soft error recovery.
Our error recovery technique will work for soft errors as long as the error has
not made it into the checkpoint snapshot. A checkpoint is corrupted when an
error is activated before, but detected after the checkpoint. We consider an
error to be masked if it does not a↵ect the primary outputs of the generated
core or the timing of those outputs. Otherwise, it is an unmasked error.
The probability of checkpoint corruption, PCC , is defined as in Equation
(3.1), where l is the unmasked error detection latency, Pl is the probability
of that particular latency (i.e.
P
l Pl = 1) and CI is the checkpoint interval
(configurable). An error is removed if either it is masked to begin with
or it is unmasked, detected, and successfully recovered by rolling back to
an uncorrupted checkpoint; we formally define the error removal rate as the
number of removed errors divided by number of total errors, as formalized
in Equation (3.2). In this equation, E is the error removal rate; M is the
error masking rate (defined as number of masked errors divided by number of
total errors); and U is the unmasked error detection rate (defined as number
of unmasked errors detected divided by number of total errors). An error is
detected (ED) in a given cycle if an error occurred in that cycle and it was
detected by our detection logic, as formalized in Equation (3.3), where Perror
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stands for the probability of error activation in each cycle and det stands for
total error detection rate given error activation. Avg.rollback is the number
of cycles, on average, that we would rollback on detection of an error. Since
the rollback length distribution is uniform, the average is approximately half
the checkpoint interval (Equation (3.4)). Thus, the average rollback cycle
overhead is the product of the average rollback length and the probability of
an error being detected in a given cycle (Equation (3.5)).
PCC =
X
l
Pl
min(l,CI)
CI
 lavg
CI
(3.1)
E = M+U(1  PCC) (3.2)
ED = Perror ⇥ det. (3.3)
Avg. Rollback =
CIX
r=1
r
CI
=
CI + 1
2
(3.4)
Cycle Overhead = ED⇥ Avg. Rollback (3.5)
3.2 Experimental Results
3.2.1 Setup
Our experimental setup is illustrated in Figure 3.5. We performed logic
synthesis with Synopsys Design Compiler 2013-12.sp1 with an ARM 45nm
standard cell library, and optimized for maximum clock frequency. We eval-
uated the detection coverage of our approach with error injection enabling
netlist transformations which support stuck-at, transient, and timing errors.
To inject stuck-at faults, the netlist transform inserts AND (for stuck-at
0) or OR (for stuck-at 1) gates at randomly selected gate outputs. To inject
transient errors, we insert XOR gates at the “D” inputs of randomly selected
flip-flops. For timing errors, we induce setup time violations by performing
timing simulations with a fast clock to collect flop-cycle pairs where timing
errors are activated while continuing error-free execution with the use of a
razor flip-flop like transformation, similar to the activation detection method
of [37]. Then we pass these flop-cycle pairs as a subset of transient errors to
our error injection enabling netlist transformation.
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Figure 3.5: Our error detection coverage evaluation framework. Our
“reliability-centric” high-level synthesis process is elaborated in Figure 3.1a.
Our customized steps are highlighted in yellow.
To accelerate fault e↵ect evaluation, we map the ASIC netlist to an Altera
Stratix III FPGA for emulation. A hardware test driver module mapped
to the FPGA communicates with the host system to facilitate thousands
of rapid (<1 second each) back-to-back full runs of the design under test,
injecting one error from the sample list at a time. As one would expect,
stuck-at faults are activated for the duration of the design execution, while
transient errors are activated for one cycle.
3.2.2 Results
We used benchmarks from the PolyBench/C 3.2 benchmark suite [38] and
modified the benchmarks to use fixed-point encodings for originally floating-
point encoded values as our transformations currently do not support floating-
point operations. We implemented fixed point arithmetic with C integer
arithmetic operations with shifts for binary point alignment. “Matrix 4x4”
is a tiled version of the matrix multiply benchmark that completely unrolls
4⇥ 4 tiles to explore performance/area tradeo↵. We synthesized our bench-
marks using our method (Section 3.1.2) and used our experimental setup
(Section 3.2.1).
To determine the area cost of our error detection approach, we compare
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Table 3.5: Area and Clock Period Overhead Results
Benchmark
Baseline Detection Total
area
(µm2)
period
(ns)
area
ov.(%)
period
ov.(%)
area
ov.(%)
period
ov.(%)
Atax 13 434 0.89 28.3  2.4 52.7 2.0
Bicg 13 923 0.90 27.4  5.2 57.6  0.9
Floyd-Warsh 12 764 0.70 26.9 0.3 57.4 5.8
Gemm 13 380 0.84 30.3 1.7 56.4 6.3
Gemver 18 855 1.00 26.8 1.5 55.4 5.4
Gesummv 13 230 0.84 30.0 1.9 57.1 6.6
Matrix 4⇥ 4 65 258 1.03 5.7 8.8 29.5 12.6
Matrix 11 151 0.80 22.1 1.0 55.6 5.9
Mvt 16 212 0.88 40.2  1.1 67.9 3.3
Symm 16 943 0.84 24.9 2.9 57.2 7.5
Syr2k 15 183 0.85 23.0 1.2 48.9 5.8
Syrk 13 975 0.89 23.1 0.1 48.9 4.5
Median 13 949 0.86 26.8 1.1 56.0 5.8
Mean 18 763 0.87 25.7 0.9 53.7 5.4
the core area of an unprotected baseline benchmark synthesized without our
mod-3 shadow datapath transformations against our experimental version
synthesized with the mod-3 transforms. Table 3.5 shows the area and clock
period overhead for both the detection logic and estimated overhead (through
characterization of the hardware in Figure 3.4) for the total logic which in-
cludes both detection and recovery. We observe on average an area cost of
25.7% for detection and estimate 53.7% for both detection and recovery. In-
terestingly, we observe a 5.7% detection area cost for the highly parallelized
“Matrix 4x4” benchmark, suggesting that lower overheads are achievable in
large high-throughput accelerator designs.
To observe fault coverage, we injected a sampling of 2,000 stuck-at, 10,000
transient and 10,000 timing errors into each synthesized core. The outcome
of our fault injection experiments is shown in Table 3.6.
For unmasked errors, we observe an average stuck-at fault coverage of
99.1%, soft error coverage of 99.5%, and timing error coverage of 99.6%. To
provide some context, Argus, which we consider to be a state-of-the-art error
detecting microprocessor, can detect 98.0% of transient errors and 98.8% of
stuck-at faults [8].
It is di cult to make a direct comparison with previous HLS work since
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Table 3.6: Fault Coverage
Benchmark
Unmasked (%) Masked (%)
stuck trans. timing stuck trans. timing
Atax 99.7 99.8 99.8 68.6 28.3 65.0
Bicg 98.9 97.1 100 73.9 31.1 57.4
Floyd-Warsh 99.9 100 100 64.8 40.9 73.4
Gemm 98.5 100 100 100 31.8 77.2
Gemver 99.5 99.9 100 78.0 18.8 77.5
Gesummv 99.9 99.3 100 67.6 38.4 56.1
Matrix 4X4 98.8 98.7 99.5 67.7 48.9 76.5
Matrix 100 100 100 76.1 25.9 54.1
Mvt 96.7 100 100 73.4 17.0 66.9
Symm 99.6 99.0 97.7 76.8 36.4 47.7
Syr2k 99.5 99.7 98.9 73.5 33.5 81.7
Syrk 98.5 100 100 71.4 31.9 73.2
Median 99.5 99.9 100 72.8 31.8 70.0
Mean 99.1 99.5 99.6 72.0 31.9 67.2
high-level synthesis benchmarks with experimental error injection and area
cost are quite limited. For reference, Concurrent Error Detection [6] uses
HLS to fully duplicate each component but attempts to compensate for area
cost through resource sharing and has around 75% area cost for a simple,
fully arithmetic datapath which in theory is not susceptible to aliasing.
Figure 3.6 shows the estimated soft error removal rate and rollback cycle
overhead for our error recovery method with checkpoint intervals ranging
from 10 to 100k cycles calculated through Equations (3.1)-(3.5).
The baseline average masking rate of the unmodified designs is 70.2%
(indicated by the lower dotted line), and we achieve an total error removal
rate (indicated by the “Error Removal Rate” curve) arbitrarily close to the
theoretical upper bound (all errors detected are corrected) which is 99.83%
(indicated by the upper dotted line).
We cannot achieve an error removal rate of 100% as we have a small per-
centage of undetected, unmasked errors. The 4 parallel lines represent roll-
back cycle overheads for di↵erent soft error rates. For reference, [39] reports
a worst case error rate of around 10 16 errors / cycle for a space environment
assuming a clock frequency of 1GHz.
What is interesting to observe is the tradeo↵ between the error removal
rate and rollback cycle overhead. Larger checkpoint intervals reduce the
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Figure 3.6: Error removal rate and rollback cycle overhead
chance of checkpoint corruption, resulting in higher error removal rates. At
the same time large checkpoint intervals result in larger jumps back in time
for each error detection triggered rollback, resulting in larger cycle overheads.
To pick a number, 1000 cycles is a reasonable tradeo↵ as we are at the point
of diminishing returns for the error removal rate (98.6%).
Figure 3.7 shows the soft error detection latency distribution for unmasked
errors, masked errors and both. “End Result Check” (ERC) is a basic er-
ror detection method involving comparing the benchmark’s output with its
expected output once execution is complete. We observe mean latencies of
8.72, 17.14, 12.75, and 36.2k cycles for unmasked, masked, both and ERC
respectively, for an error detection latency improvement of 4150x over the
ERC.
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Figure 3.7: Soft error detection latency distribution
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CHAPTER 4
VALIDATION THROUGH HYBRID
SIGNATURE GENERATION
In this chapter, I present the Hybrid Quick Error Detection (H-QED) tech-
nique to overcome PSV challenges for non-programmable hardware accel-
erators in SoCs. Such accelerators implement a pre-defined set of functions
and are not programmable using software (unlike processor cores or software-
programmable accelerators such as GPUs). H-QED is inspired by the QED
technique for PSV [14, 15, 16, 17]. Since QED is (mostly) implemented in
software, the error detection latencies of bugs inside hardware accelerators
can be very long (e.g., bounded by long execution times of hardware acceler-
ators). H-QED builds on advances in high-level synthesis (HLS) [40, 41] to
overcome this challenge by automatically embedding small hardware struc-
tures inside hardware accelerators. H-QED simultaneously improves error
detection latencies and coverage of logic and electrical bugs inside hardware
accelerators. H-QED is compatible with QED. By combining H-QED with
QED, we provide a systematic solution for PSV of SoCs consisting of pro-
cessor cores, uncore components, software-programmable accelerators, and
hardware accelerators.
To the best of our knowledge, H-QED presents the first work that inte-
grates HLS to overcome PSV challenges of SoCs. The input to H-QED is a
specification of the hardware accelerator using a high-level language (C/C++
in this paper). H-QED then automatically creates an accelerator with built-
in features for hybrid checking using hardware and software techniques. The
checking techniques operate in a highly coordinated manner as follows:
1. During design, our H-QED-aware HLS engine automatically creates
an H-QED-enabled accelerator from the input specification. Each H-
QED-enabled accelerator contains small hardware structures for special
hardware signatures that capture the execution behavior of the accel-
erator during PSV.
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2. During design, our H-QED-aware HLS engine also creates a software
version of the accelerator by inserting additional instructions in the
specification of the accelerator (C/C++ source code in this paper).
When this software version is executed on a processor (not necessarily
on the same SoC being validated), the additional instructions capture
the execution behavior of the software version using special software
signatures.
3. During PSV, the hardware signatures generated by the hardware accel-
erator are stored in dedicated on-chip memory.1 At the end of a PSV
run, these signatures are compared against the software signatures ob-
tained from the execution of the software version. We guarantee that,
under bug-free situations, the hardware signatures exactly match the
software signatures (for the same inputs). Thus, a mismatch indicates
detection of errors (caused by bugs). Note that the execution of the
software version is decoupled from the PSV run.
We demonstrate the e↵ectiveness and practicality of H-QED by showing that:
1. H-QED enables two orders of magnitude improvement in error detec-
tion latencies for both electrical bugs and logic bugs vs. PSV techniques
using end result checks that compare accelerator outputs against known
correct outputs;
2. H-QED improves electrical bug (timing error) coverage by up to 3X
compared to PSV techniques using end result checks;
3. H-QED uncovered four previously unknown logic bugs in the widely
used CHStone HLS benchmark suite [42];
4. H-QED incurs less than 10% overhead for the accelerator it validates,
and negligible performance costs;
5. H-QED does not require any failure reproduction2 or low-level simula-
tion (e.g., RTL or netlist) to detect bugs;
1It is possible to stream out the signatures to o↵-chip memory using on-chip memory
interfaces or JTAG ports.
2Failure reproduction involves returning the system to an error-free state and re-running
the system with the exact input stimuli (e.g., test instructions; test inputs; and operating
conditions such as voltage, temperature, and frequency), and is di cult due to Heisenbug
e↵ects [43].
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6. By operating hardware accelerators in native mode (similar to normal
system operation) and by using dedicated on-chip memory to store
hardware signatures during PSV, H-QED minimizes intrusiveness (i.e.,
incorporation of H-QED continues to detect bugs that are detected by
traditional PSV techniques).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1.1 presents our
H-QED technique and Section 4.2 presents our experimental results.
4.1 Method
4.1.1 H-QED Overview
Figure 4.1 shows an SoC-level view of our H-QED-enabled accelerators. The
SoC typically consists of processor core(s), accelerator(s) (H-QED-enabled in
our case), and uncore components. The inputs and outputs of the H-QED-
enabled accelerators are supplied by the processor cores inside the SoC. Dur-
ing PSV, the H-QED-enabled accelerators generate hardware signatures that
are saved in dedicated on-chip memories (Figure 4.1(a)). Figure 4.2 shows
the overall H-QED flow. It takes as input the high-level design of a hard-
ware accelerator (C/C++ source code in this paper) and produces the RTL
implementation of the H-QED-enabled accelerator. This H-QED-enabled ac-
celerator contains embedded hardware structures (Hardware Signature Gen-
eration in Figure 4.2) that generate a sequence of hardware signatures during
a PSV run. Care must be taken to ensure that the hardware signatures in-
side the accelerator do not cause excessive intrusiveness during PSV, e.g.,
by stalling the accelerator or by interfering with its input and output data
tra c. Excessive intrusiveness can prevent activation of bugs inside the ac-
celerator during PSV. In an e↵ort to minimize intrusiveness, H-QED stores
hardware signatures in dedicated on-chip memory with dedicated communi-
cation channels (Figure 4.1(a)). The costs associated with this storage are
reported as part of H-QED area costs. It may be possible to minimize sig-
nature storage costs (while controlling intrusiveness) by streaming hardware
signatures to o↵-chip memory using JTAG ports. The H-QED flow also gen-
erates a functionally equivalent software version of the hardware accelerator.
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This software version is compiled from the same C/C++ source code as the
hardware accelerator. It is augmented with instructions to generate software
signatures when the software version is executed on a processor (Software
Signature Generation in Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.1: H-QED-enabled accelerators inside an SoC. (a) SoC-level view,
and (b) block diagram of an H-QED-enabled accelerator showing the
accelerator and the signature generator.
During PSV, the sequence of hardware signatures (stored in on-chip mem-
ory) is collected at the end of a PSV run. Note that during the PSV run,
the hardware accelerator (and the overall SoC) operates in its native mode.
Bugs inside the accelerator are thus expected to be activated during the PSV
run. Next, the software version is executed on a processor; strategies to pro-
vide the same inputs to the software version as the hardware accelerator are
discussed later in this section. The software version generates a sequence
of software signatures during its execution. Bugs may or may not be acti-
vated during the execution of the software version. Hence, the execution of
the software version can be totally decoupled from the PSV run. For ex-
ample, the user may choose to execute the software version on a di↵erent
hardware platform vs. the PSV run. The sequence of hardware signatures
obtained from the PSV run is compared with the sequence of software sig-
natures obtained from the execution of the software version; any mismatch
indicates bug detection. Since the execution of the software version and the
subsequent signature comparisons are totally decoupled from the PSV run,
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Figure 4.2: H-QED flow
we minimize possible intrusiveness introduced by H-QED. In order to ensure
that the hardware signatures match the software signatures (under bug-free
conditions), we must ensure that the software version receives the same in-
puts as the hardware accelerator. This can be accomplished in several ways.
Two examples include:
1. After a test is executed during a PSV run (in native mode), the SoC
may be configured so that the hardware accelerator is disabled and the
software version is swapped in. Next, the same test can be executed
to generate software signatures. Note that this is di↵erent from fail-
ure reproduction because we do not require bugs to be activated (or
reproduced) during the second run.
2. After a test is executed during a PSV run (in native mode), the same
test may be run again with the SoC (and the test) configured to cap-
ture (and store) accelerator inputs at pre-defined memory locations.
Using these captured accelerator inputs, the software version can then
be executed either on the embedded processor core of the SoC being
validated, or on some other processors to generate software signatures.
Similar to earlier discussions, we do not require bugs to be activated
(or reproduced) after the first PSV run.
We built our framework on top of LLVM [44, 45] using a common LLVM
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Internal Representation (LLVM-IR) to drive the generation of the H-QED-
enabled hardware accelerator and the corresponding software version.
4.1.2 Hardware Signature Generation
Consider the input pseudo-code shown in Listing 4.1. It defines two arrays Z
and B with element addresses z ptr and b ptr. It also defines a single basic
block bb1 (a basic block is a basic building block in LLVM-IR representing a
piece of code with only one control entry point and only one exit point) that
has already been scheduled to execute in hardware across three consecutive
clock cycles (bb1.0, bb1.1, bb1.2). Hardware corresponding to this code is
shown in Figure 4.3. The datapath is controlled by an FSM, where each
scheduled clock cycle corresponds to one state in the FSM, and cycle tran-
sitions are controlled by the FSM state transitions. In this example, bb1.0,
bb1.1, and bb1.2 represent three di↵erent FSM states.
Listing 4.1: Input Pseudo-code Example
int Z [ 1 0 0 ] , B [ 2 0 0 ] ;
z p t r = add r e s s o f (Z [ 1 ] )
b pt r = add r e s s o f (B[ 1 0 ] )
bb1 . 0 : z = load mem( z p t r )
bb1 . 1 : a = x + y
b = a ⇥ z
bb1 . 2 : s t o r e b ! mem( b ptr )
The first step in hardware signature generation is to determine the probe
schedule: for each clock cycle, we determine which variables should be probed
so that these variables contribute to the hardware signature. We perform
probing for three kinds of hardware components: memory inputs/outputs,
data registers (registers that store intermediate data, such as x and y in Fig-
ure 4.3), and control state registers storing FSM states. These components
then provide probe signals that drive the hardware signature generation logic
(consisting of an XOR function and an LFSR). We refer to the physical wires
carrying these probe signals as probe ports (Figure 4.3).
Since the number of data register bits can be high, we use two strategies to
minimize register probe ports: ignore “temporary” variables, and share ports
through multiplexers. Both strategies start with variable lifetime analysis:
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Figure 4.3: H-QED-enabled accelerator with hardware signature generation
for each variable in the input code, we determine the states in which it is
alive. We define non-temporary lifetime as one that crosses more than one
state transition, at least one of which is a basic block boundary (i.e., the
variable is alive across more than one basic block). Any variable that does
not satisfy these criteria is not probed. In our example, variables x and y
meet our criteria, while z, a, and b do not (assuming they are not used in a
subsequent basic block).
Our scheduler attempts to schedule a probe for a variable in its use state.
For example, state bb1.1 is a use state of variables x, y, and z because these
variables are accessed (“used”) in this state. To allocate a minimum number
of register probe ports, our algorithm attempts to create a feasible probe
schedule using a single register probe initially starting from the first use
state. For example, we first schedule y to be probed in state bb1.1; as a
result, we are unable to schedule a probe for x in that same state (since there
is only a single register probe). To resolve this problem, we probe x in the
predecessor state bb1.0 where it is alive as well, generating a multiplexer to
share the register probe port. If scheduling fails, we attempt to schedule
again with an additional register probe.
We connect each control state register to its own dedicated probe port,
allowing us to generate signatures from the control FSM. We also probe
memory inputs and outputs in all states where they are alive and used; i.e.,
they are used to transfer valid data. In our example, we perform a load in
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state bb1.0 and a store in state bb1.2. Hence, the memory “data out” port
is probed in state bb1.0 and the memory “data in” port is probed in state
bb1.2 as annotated in Figure 4.3. The memory address port is probed in
both bb1.0 and bb1.2.
Every annotated probe port in Figure 4.3 has a MUX associated with it.
The MUX output drives the port to logic 0 when it is not probed. The select
signals of the MUX are derived from the corresponding states annotated in
Figure 4.3. All probe ports are fed into an XOR function, which reduces the
number of input bits and produces outputs that match the size of the LFSR.
We design the XOR function as an XOR tree so it can reduce n inputs down
to m outputs through partitioning n inputs into m groups and reducing each
group into a single bit. The LFSR can output one-bit of hardware signature
periodically (the number of cycles in the period can be configured using a
counter).
To avoid clock period overhead, we register each probe port output. This
e↵ectively pipelines the signature generation logic, adding a cycle delay in
exchange for avoiding gate upsizing (and thus minimizing the area cost) of
our signature generation logic. Since memory addresses are included in H-
QED signatures, we must ensure that the signatures of memory addresses
produced by the hardware accelerator match that of the software version
(details in Section 4.1.3).
4.1.3 Software Signature Generation
For H-QED software signature generation, our HLS engine generates a probe
schedule file together with hardware memory addresses assigned by the HLS
engine, shown in Listing 4.2 for our earlier example. For each state, the
probe schedule provides a state encoding (e.g., 1 for state bb1.0, 2 for bb1.1)
as well as a list of variables that are probed in that state. The hardware
memory address section provides the statically assigned address for each
memory variable.
Listing 4.2: Probe schedule and hardware memory addresses
// s i gna tu r e output s chedu l e
bb1 . 0 : 1 , z pt r , z , x
bb1 . 1 : 2 , y
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bb1 . 2 : 3 , b ptr , b
// hardware memory addre s se s
Z : hardware base address : 0x1000
B: hardware base address : 0x2000
Given a probe schedule and hardware memory addresses, software signature
generation works as follows. For each state (e.g., bb1.0, bb1.1, bb1.2), we
look up the variables probed in that state, and insert into the software an
XOR function of the probed variables and the state encoding, emulating the
hardware XOR function (e.g., the one in Figure 4.3).
The memory addresses used by the hardware accelerator are not the same
as that of the software version. On the hardware side, the address space is
mapped by HLS into memory blocks, one for each statically allocated array.
It is desirable to partition the address such that one partition of bits selects
the memory block; the remaining bits then select a word within the memory
block. Each memory block can also have customized word size to optimize
throughput and minimize area cost. On the software side, the statically
allocated variables are packed by a compiler into a static memory segment
of the generated executable, typically with the goal of minimizing memory
usage. Moreover, all of the variables have the same word size.
For software signatures to match the hardware ones, we implemented a
conversion function. This function converts each address used in the soft-
ware version to the corresponding hardware address before being fed to the
XOR function for software signature generation. This is possible because our
HLS tool produces a mapping to indicate how the variables are mapped to
memory addresses on the hardware side (shown in Listing 4.2). The addi-
tional code for this address conversion on the software side does no harm
to bug detection; this is because bugs are not required to be activated or
reproduced during the execution of the software version.
For an address variable addr (e.g., z ptr or b ptr) in the software address
space, we pass it through the software to hardware address conversion func-
tion. First, this conversion function determines which variable addr points
to (in this case, Z or B) and the address o↵set into that variable (e.g., 1 for Z
and 10 for B). Next, the converter looks up the variable (Z or B) in the hard-
ware memory addresses section of the probe schedule file, and returns the
corresponding hardware address with the appropriate o↵sets. This hardware
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address drives the XOR function.
The outputs of the XOR function are passed to an LFSR function, which
imitates the hardware LFSR. The LFSR function also mimics exactly the
signature output interval of the hardware LFSR, enabling the software to
generate signatures that match the hardware. Listing 4.3 shows the resulting
H-QED-enabled software version for our example.
Listing 4.3: H-QED enabled software version
z = load z p t r
s o f t w a r e l f s r (1   addr convert ( z p t r )   z   x )
a = x + y
b = a ⇥ z
s o f t w a r e l f s r (2   y )
s t o r e b ! b ptr
s o f t w a r e l f s r (3   addr convert ( b ptr )   b)
4.1.4 Binding to Minimize Area
E cient operator and data register sharing is crucial for minimizing H-QED
area costs. We implemented a binding engine which aggressively shares op-
erators among instructions and registers among variables, as long as their
lifetimes do not overlap, in order to minimize area costs. However, such shar-
ing introduces MUXes. Therefore, we developed heuristics to optimize mux
widths for binding by reusing hardware components, wires, and correspond-
ing mux inputs that have already been allocated (we call it zero-cost binding).
We use a greedy heuristic to exploit zero cost binding opportunities. Instruc-
tions and variables are bound to hardware components iteratively. During
each iteration for instruction or variable binding, we choose the binding so-
lution with the lowest area cost. We also attempt to share existing probe
ports at the register outputs through zero cost binding solutions.
4.2 Experimental Results
To demonstrate the e↵ectiveness and practicality of H-QED, we ran a se-
ries of simulation and FPGA-based emulation experiments to collect data
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for area and clock period overheads, error detection latencies, and coverage
estimates for logic and electrical bugs. We used all 12 benchmarks from CH-
Stone [42] and 15 benchmarks from the PolyBench [38] benchmark suites.
The benchmarks we selected from PolyBench are ones that can be imple-
mented with fixed-point operations because our framework does not support
floating-point operations yet.
We used a 16-bit LFSR and outputted the least significant bit from the
LFSR as a signature at a regular interval. We fixed the signature output in-
terval of each benchmark at 100 cycles or the interval that would result in 5%
signature storage area cost, whichever interval is larger. While aliasing will
occur with 50% probability in the single-bit signatures, the LFSR maintains
a running hash (see Section 1.5.2) that captures the internal behavior of the
accelerator with negligible aliasing probability. If the software and hardware
LFSRs mismatch, a single-bit signature mismatch will soon follow. At the
end of benchmark execution, we dump the full contents of both LFSRs as
signatures to insure that any late mismatch in the LSFRs is detected.
4.2.1 Hardware Area and Delay Costs
To determine the area and delay costs of adding H-QED signature generation
logic to an accelerator, we performed HLS with and without H-QED. We
then performed logic synthesis using Synopsys Design Compiler 2013-12.sp1,
mapping to the 45nm ARM standard cell library, and targeting maximum
clock frequency. The area and clock period overheads for each accelerator
core are shown in Figure 4.4. Results show a mean accelerator-level area cost
of 8.3%. We observe no clock period overhead on average.
4.2.2 Logic Bugs
To evaluate the e↵ectiveness of H-QED in detecting logic bugs, we considered
bugs in the current and past versions of CHStone [42], as well as bugs in our
HLS engine itself.
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baseline experimental signature memory normalized chip-level
clock period area clock period area sig bits bits + end lfsr dump
SRAM 
area
area w/
SRAM
zero 
padding
clock 
period area
area w/ 
SRAM area
area w/
SRAM
adpcm 1.277 92,374 1.30 95,335 219 235 74 95,409 0.000 0.016 0.032 0.033 0.007 0.007
aes 0.688 64,923 0.658 69,430 38 54 17 69,447 0.000 -0.044 0.069 0.070 0.015 0.015
atax 0.892 13,434 0.861 15,027 105 121 38 15,065 0.000 -0.035 0.119 0.121 0.025 0.026
bicg 0.903 13,923 0.829 16,047 66 82 26 16,072 0.000 -0.082 0.153 0.154 0.033 0.033
blowfish 0.597 57,418 0.571 59,295 1,792 1,808 570 59,864 0.000 -0.044 0.033 0.043 0.007 0.009
dfadd 0.749 36,348 0.765 39,058 6 22 7 39,065 0.000 0.021 0.075 0.075 0.016 0.016
dfdiv 0.89 94,928 0.865 100,390 19 35 11 100,401 0.000 -0.028 0.058 0.058 0.012 0.012
dfmul 0.691 49,835 0.695 54,172 2 18 6 54,178 0.000 0.006 0.087 0.087 0.019 0.019
dfsin 0.898 163,386 0.889 178,041 545 561 177 178,218 0.000 -0.010 0.090 0.091 0.019 0.020
doitgen 0.847 16,434 0.850 18,062 2,609 2,625 827 18,888 0.000 0.004 0.099 0.149 0.021 0.032
floyd-warsh 0.701 12,764 0.698 13,775 1,712 1,728 544 14,319 0.000 -0.004 0.079 0.122 0.017 0.026
gemm 0.844 13,830 0.856 15,188 1,457 1,473 464 15,652 0.000 0.014 0.098 0.132 0.021 0.028
gemvar 0.998 18,855 1.031 20,220 161 177 56 20,276 0.000 0.033 0.072 0.075 0.016 0.016
gesummv
0.836 13,230 0.844 14,080 64 80 25 14,105 0.000 0.010 0.064 0.066 0.014 0.014
gsm
1.094 109,914 1.111 113,575 52 68 21 113,597 0.000 0.016 0.033 0.034 0.007 0.007
jpeg
1.199 172,344 1.166 179,705 8,605 8,621 2,716 182,421 0.000 -0.028 0.043 0.058 0.009 0.013
matrix4x4 1.03 65,258 1.017 64,355 34 50 16 64,371 0.000 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.003 -0.003
matrix 0.801 11,551 0.8 12,860 328 344 108 12,968 0.000 0.015 0.113 0.123 0.024 0.026
mips 0.912 32,586 0.901 33,698 54 70 22 33,720 0.000 -0.012 0.034 0.035 0.007 0.007
motion 0.643 32,979 0.636 36,081 63 79 25 36,106 0.000 -0.011 0.094 0.095 0.020 0.020
mvt 0.875 16,212 0.878 17,757 86 102 32 17,790 0.000 0.003 0.095 0.097 0.021 0.021
reg-detect 0.931 45,131 0.923 44,993 7,164 7,180 2,262 47,255 0.000 -0.009 -0.003 0.047 -0.001 0.010
sha 0.917 54,017 0.970 57,048 2,559 2,575 811 57,859 0.000 0.058 0.056 0.071 0.012 0.015
symm 0.837 16,943 0.842 18,039 751 767 242 18,281 0.000 0.006 0.065 0.079 0.014 0.017
syr2k 0.848 15,183 0.840 16,469 1,795 1,811 570 17,040 0.000 -0.009 0.085 0.122 0.018 0.026
syrk 0.894 13,975 0.899 15,212 1,467 1,483 467 15,680 0.000 0.006 0.089 0.122 0.019 0.026
trmm 0.834 20,312 0.817 22,442 12 28 9 22,451 0.000 -0.020 0.105 0.105 0.023 0.023
median 0.875 32,586 0.856 33,698 161 177 56 33,720 0.000 -0.004 0.075 0.079 0.016 0.017
mean 0.875 46,966 0.871 49,643 1,176 1,192 376 50,018 0.000 -0.005 0.071 0.083 0.015 0.018
Clock period Signature generation area
Signature storage area
 1
Figure 4.4: Area and performance overheads
CHStone Bugs
For CHStone bugs, we identified all of the bug fixes in the version history
and confirmed those bugs with the CHStone authors. For each bug found,
we isolated it by fixing all of the other bugs in the last version of CHStone
with that bug, creating bug benchmarks containing one known bug each.
We ran each buggy benchmark through our H-QED process (Figure 4.2 on
page 39), producing hardware and software versions for the same buggy code
that we executed to produce signatures for internal behavior and benchmark
outputs. We also maintained a third, known correct result for each CHStone
benchmark that we used as an additional check for the results of the hardware
execution. Table 4.1 enumerates the results of our logic bug experiments.
The columns are as follows:
• Benchmark indicates the CHStone benchmark containing the bug.
• Version indicates the versions of CHStone in which the bug is present.
• File and Line denote the location of the bug in the last version of the
source code that contains the bug.
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Table 4.1: Evaluation of H-QED against Logic Bugs in CHStone
(previously unknown bugs highlighted in bold)
Bench Vers. File Lines Type ND ERC HQ Both
adpcm 1.1-1.8 adpcm.c 686-690 MLU no 21.8k - 21.8k
jpeg 1.6-1.9 decode.c
206 *++ unact
207 *++ unact
211 *++ unact
gsm 1.1-1.4 lpc.c
87-88 OOB C only - - -
150-151 OOB C only - - -
157-158 OOB yes - 77 77
mips
1.1-1.10 mips.c 255 INIT yes - 23 23
1.11 mips.c 132-135 OOB yes - 110 110
motion
1.1-1.2 mpeg2.c 225-226 OOB yes 90 10 10
1.1-1.4
getbits.c 113 SHFT C only 100 - 100
motion.c
155 SHFT C only - - -
160 SHFT yes 45 45 45
166 SHFT unact
1.1-1.10 getbits.c
134 SHFT yes - 105 105
144 SHFT yes - 91 91
155 SHFT unact
Counts 17 11 4 7 9
MLU = Manual loop unrolling omits one iteration
*++ = Wrongly assuming postincrement (++) has lower precedence than dereference (*)
OOB = Out-of-bounds array access
INIT = Read of uninitialized variable
SHFT = Bit shift by out-of-bounds amount
• Type provides information about the nature of the bug.
• ND indicates if the bug is nondeterministic. Some bugs are nondeter-
ministic at the C-level, but not at the LLVM level. Others are never
activated during benchmark execution.
• ERC denotes the result of comparing the hardware result with the
known correct result. If the bug is caught (i.e. the results do not
match), this column notes the latency (in cycles) from bug activation
to the end of benchmark execution.
• HQ indicates the error detection latency (in cycles) from comparing
hardware and software executions through the H-QED process.
• Both provides the result of combining (i.e. taking the better of) the
ERC and HQ columns.
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Of the seventeen bugs we identified in CHStone, only twelve were activated
during benchmark execution. Unactivated bugs, by definition, are unde-
tectable. Some unactivated bugs correspond to code that is not used or not
needed, in which case such code should be removed since it adds overhead
to the hardware accelerator. Other unactivated bugs are the result of cover-
age limits of the existing test vectors in CHStone. For both cases, traditional
code coverage evaluation techniques will allow the hardware designer to iden-
tify uncovered code or operand ranges and either remove the functionality
or improve the test vectors for full coverage so that all bugs in the code are
activated.
Of the twelve activated bugs, one bug involving the omission of an itera-
tion in loop unrolling was deterministic, resulting in identical hardware and
software behavior. Comparing the benchmark output with the known cor-
rect result catches the bug. As mentioned in Section 1.5.1, this bug could be
isolated with traditional software debugging techniques.
For the remaining eleven bugs, all are non-deterministic according to stan-
dard C semantics, but for four of these bugs, our compiler infrastructure
performed optimization transforms that made the behavior deterministic at
the LLVM-IR level. In some cases, compiler transformations actually “fixed”
the bug, producing LLVM-IR isomorphic to that generated by the bug-free
version of the benchmark. In other cases, the compiler transform replaced the
nondeterministic bug with a deterministic variant. In both cases, the com-
piler identified an undefined operation, and silently, arbitrarily assigned the
result (which is legal because the behavior is undefined). Whether the bug
is “fixed” or made deterministic is a matter of whether the arbitrary choice
the compiler makes happens to correspond to the behavior the programmer
intended. Bugs of this nature could be isolated if the compiler optimization
passes emitted warnings when they identify nondeterminism. Since the four
bugs in question are deterministic at the LLVM level, the hardware and soft-
ware execution are identical and thus signature comparison does not detect
these bugs. One of the bugs in “getbits.c” that was made deterministic,
however, was caught by the end result comparison. Provided that the com-
piler transformations can be reproduced, this bug can also be isolated with
traditional software debugging techniques using an LLVM debugger.
The remaining seven bugs are nondeterministic at the LLVM-level and
all are caught by H-QED. Of these seven bugs, five are masked, rendering
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the end result check unable to detect those bugs. Recall from Section 1.3
that masked bugs are not necessarily benign in validation testing as mask-
ing conditions can be a↵ected by the testing environment. Of those five
bugs, four (highlighted in bold) were previously unknown bugs in the CH-
Stone benchmark suite that we discovered by using H-QED, suggesting that
these nondeterministic, masked bugs are the most di cult bugs to find. We
confirmed these new bugs with the CHStone authors.
Overall, in our CHStone bug experiments we observe that of the twelve
activated bugs, the end result check catches four of the bugs, H-QED catches
seven of the bugs, and that combining the two techniques results in a coverage
of nine out of twelve.
HLS Engine Bugs
For HLS engine bugs, we considered bugs that we fixed during the develop-
ment of our HLS engine. The bugs involve initialization errors for global vari-
ables in the JPEG benchmark (mapped to hardware memory). We injected
each bug, one at a time, into our hardware design for the JPEG benchmark
by modifying the memory initialization procedure for the corresponding vari-
able. Table 4.2 enumerates the bugs and detection results. The “variable”
column indicates the global variable a↵ected by the bug. The other columns
have the same meaning as Table 4.1.
Table 4.2: Evaluation of H-QED against HLS Engine Logic Bugs
Bench Vers. Variable Type ERC HQ Both
jpeg
1.1-1.11 read position ZERO 838k 179 179
1.1-1.4
p dhtbl maxcode NOINIT - 249 249
p dhtbl mincode NOINIT - 349 349
p dhtbl valptr NOINIT - 349 349
Counts 4 1 4 4
ZERO = Global variable initialized to zero, ignoring nonzero initializer
NOINIT = Global variable not initialized, ignoring implicit zero initializer
Our experiments show that for the “ZERO” bug, H-QED error detection
latency is over three orders of magnitude faster than the end result check. The
“NOINIT” bugs are masked, so the end result check is unable to detect them,
but H-QED does. Overall, H-QED dominates in error detection coverage
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and latency for HLS engine bugs because an HLS engine bug results in a
hardware design with di↵erent internal behavior, but does not a↵ect the
software version. Di↵erences in internal behavior between the hardware and
software versions are quickly caught by H-QED.
4.2.3 Electrical Bugs
In this section, we present a study of timing errors as representative electrical
bugs. To evaluate the e↵ectiveness of H-QED for detecting such electrical
bugs, we injected timing errors into each of our benchmark designs. Such
a process begins with running each benchmark through HLS with H-QED,
feeding the output RTL code to Design Compiler, and compiling for tim-
ing optimization. To identify timing error activations, we use an approach
similar to the “ground truth” method in [37]: for each flip-flop in the logic
netlist, add a duplicate flip-flop connected to the same “D” input, but with
an additional half-cycle delay on the input. This flip-flop’s “Q” output is left
unconnected as it is used only to trigger reports of timing violations (by a
timing simulator) while the original flip-flops maintain the error free execu-
tion of the benchmark. We ran timing simulations with the modified netlist
and compiled the timing violations reported into a set of (flip-flop, cycle)
pair, referred to as “injection candidates.” We selected a random subset of
these candidates with size n (we set n = 500) to use in our error injection
experiments. Starting again from the original netlist, we applied another
netlist transform, which inserts XOR gates at the “D” input of flip-flops cor-
responding to the selected injection candidates. We added additional logic
to control each XOR gate, enabling error injection at a specific cycle. We
mapped the transformed netlist to an FPGA (Altera Stratix III) for emu-
lation purposes, and performed n full execution runs for each benchmark,
injecting one error from the selected “injection candidates” during each run
(bit flip at the input of the given flip-flop at the given cycle).
Timing error coverage (number of errors detected divided by the number of
errors injected) is presented in Figure 4.5, including both masked (errors that
do not propagate to accelerator outputs so they are invisible externally) and
unmasked errors (errors that propagate to the primary outputs and a↵ect
accelerator results). Note that the unmasked timing error detection coverage
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unmasked masked coverage
unactivated undetected detected undetected detected samples ERC H-QED
adpcm 0 2 245 33 220 500 0.494 0.440 0.934
aes 0 2 300 99 99 500 0.604 0.198 0.802
atax 0 0 349 86 65 500 0.698 0.130 0.828
bicg 0 0 324 75 101 500 0.648 0.202 0.850
blowfish 0 1 335 45 119 500 0.672 0.238 0.910
dfadd 0 31 149 145 175 500 0.360 0.350 0.710
dfdiv 0 16 202 168 114 500 0.436 0.228 0.664
dfmul 0 27 129 205 139 500 0.312 0.278 0.590
dfsin 0 1 258 149 92 500 0.518 0.184 0.702
doitgen 0 0 314 18 168 500 0.628 0.336 0.964
floyd-warsh 0 0 255 68 177 500 0.510 0.354 0.864
gemm 0 0 340 13 147 500 0.680 0.294 0.974
gemver 0 0 275 52 173 500 0.550 0.346 0.896
gesummv 0 0 362 14 124 500 0.724 0.248 0.972
gsm 0 2 225 37 236 500 0.454 0.472 0.926
jpeg 0 3 284 59 154 500 0.574 0.308 0.882
matrix 0 0 252 178 70 500 0.504 0.140 0.644
matrix4x4 0 0 391 29 80 500 0.782 0.160 0.942
mips 0 2 173 146 179 500 0.350 0.358 0.708
motion 0 1 80 79 340 500 0.162 0.680 0.842
mvt 0 1 334 19 146 500 0.670 0.292 0.962
reg-detect 0 0 266 50 184 500 0.532 0.368 0.900
sha 0 1 273 58 168 500 0.548 0.336 0.884
symm 0 0 383 15 102 500 0.766 0.204 0.970
syr2k 0 0 314 21 165 500 0.628 0.330 0.958
syrk 0 0 332 17 151 500 0.664 0.302 0.966
trmm 0 1 304 38 157 500 0.610 0.314 0.924
median 0.0 1.0 284.0 52.0 151.0 500.0 0.574 0.302 0.896
mean 0.0 3.4 275.9 71.0 149.8 500.0 0.558 0.300 0.858
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Figure 4.5: Timing error detection coverage
H-QED End Result Check
latency coverage laten y coverage
1 0.000000 1 0.0000
2 0.002889 2 0.0000
3 0.006222 3 0.0003
4 0.010444 4 0.0003
5 0.013556 5 0.0004
6 0.017037 6 0.0004
7 0.021185 7 0.0007
8 0.024741 8 0.0009
9 0.029111 9 0.0010
10 0.032222 10 0.0012
11 0.036815 11 0.0015
12 0.040148 12 0.0015
13 0.043778 13 0.0016
14 0.046889 14 0.0017
15 0.050148 15 0.0019
16 0.057778 16 0.0023
18 0.065481 18 0.0024
20 0.073037 20 0.0024
22 0.080000 22 0.0030
24 0.086815 24 0.0036
26 0.094074 26 0.0042
28 0.102741 28 0.0044
30 0.109185 30 0.0047
32 0.123630 32 0.0053
36 0.140296 36 0.0059
40 0.155111 40 0.0065
44 0.170296 44 0.0068
48 0.185556 48 0.0070
52 0.202593 52 0.0077
56 0.217704 56 0.0084
60 0.232000 60 0.0090
64 0.263926 64 0.0101
72 0.293556 72 0.0106
80 0.325778 80 0.0115
88 0.358000 88 0.0126
96 0.387704 96 0.0139
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Figure 4.6: Overall timing error coverage as a function of error detection
latency
is 100% with H-QED (i.e., we detect all unmasked errors). The overall error
detection latency distribution is shown in Figure 4.6. We observed mean
timing error detection coverage for H-QED of 85.8% compared to 55.8%
for the end result check, resulting in 3.1x improvement (i.e., reduction) in
undetected timing errors. We also observed a mean error detection latency
of 705 cycles for H-QED, compared to 124,490 cycles for end result check,
resulting in 176x improvement (i.e., reduction) in error detection latency.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
In our modulo-3 shadow datapath work, we have designed and implemented
a fully automated high-level synthesis process to create error detecting cores
capable of detecting an average of 99.42% of unmasked errors for an assort-
ment of three di↵erent kinds of fault models with negligible delay cost, 25.7%
area cost, and a detection latency 4150x faster than an end result check. We
have taken the first step towards the fully automated generation of low area
cost, low development cost reliable hardware through high-level synthesis.
We also explored a rollback recovery method for soft errors with an addi-
tional area cost of 28% through which we achieve up to a 175x increase
in reliability against soft errors. Future directions related to this research
include:
1. adding support for floating-point operations;
2. exploring other modular bases (5,7,9, etc.);
3. fixing timing errors through rollback combined with frequency-voltage
scaling.
H-QED utilizes HLS principles for quickly detecting bugs inside hardware
accelerators in SoCs. Our results demonstrate the e↵ectiveness and prac-
ticality of H-QED: up to two orders of magnitude improvement in error
detection latency, up to threefold improvement in coverage, less than 10%
accelerator-level overhead, and with negligible performance overhead. Fur-
thermore, H-QED also discovered previously unknown bugs in the widely
used CHStone HLS benchmark suite. Through hybrid hardware/software
signatures, H-QED minimizes intrusiveness during PSV. Thus, the combina-
tion of QED and H-QED provides a systematic approach to PSV of complex
SoCs consisting of processor cores, uncore components, programmable ac-
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celerators, and hardware accelerators. Future directions related to H-QED
include:
1. Use of H-QED for a wide variety of high-level descriptions beyond C
and C++ (e.g., various domain-specific languages);
2. Use of H-QED for programmable accelerators;
3. Integration of H-QED with formal analysis tools for automatic debug.
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